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ARTICLE EIGHT OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE: THE HEARSAY RULE
LARRY G. EVANS*
INTRODUCTION
This article will deal with the treatment of hearsay evidence by
Article Eight of the Federal Rules of Evidence.' The history of the
hearsay rule, as well as prior efforts at its codification, will be dis-
cussed. The development of the Federal Rules of Evidence will be
traced through the Judicial Conference of the United States, the
United States Supreme Court and the United States Congress.
The Federal Rules of Evidence contain eleven articles. Of these,
only Article Eight, dealing with hearsay, will be addressed here.
Necessarily, other articles will be mentioned, but only in the context
of their effect upon Article Eight. For example, rules 405 and 608:1
deal with reputation evidence of character, but they are also treated
in rule 803(21)1 of Article Eight. Whenever significant, not only the
final Article Eight rule but also the change from the original pro-
posal of the Judicial Conference will be discussed.
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence in general, and Article
Eight in particular, technically apply only to proceedings in the
courts of the United States and before United States magistrates,
it is safe to predict that their effect will be felt in many other forums.
In much the same way that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have led the way in reform of civil procedure in many states, the
Federal Rules of Evidence may well be the forerunner of evidentiary
change in state courts and legislatures.
Even before formal adoption by Congress, some United States
courts were citing portions of the new rules. ' Many state courts have
* Member of the Indiana Bar.
1. 120 CONG. REC. 570 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974) (a bill to establish rules of evidence for
certain courts and proceedings). The Federal Rules were passed by the House of Representa-
tives on February 6, 1974, and then sent to the Senate. Pursuant to rule 1103 of the Bill, all
citations to the rules will be to sections of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
2. FED. R. EvID. 405.
3. FED. R. EvID. 608.
4. FED. R. EvID. 803(21).
5. See United States v. Metcalf, 430 F.2d 1197, 1199 (8th Cir. 1970) (holding that the
adoption of another's statement may constitute an incriminatory admission), citing what is
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referred to the rules as well and have relied upon them in reaching
their decisions.' In addition, the Supreme Court of New Mexico
adopted the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence virtually without
change7 and the Nevada legislature adopted these rules in 1971 with
only some changes in the area of privilege."
Portions of the Article Eight changes will, under the right cir-
cumstances, make it advantageous to practice under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, as opposed to practice under state rules, and
forum shopping would not be an unexpected side effect of the adop-
tion of the federal guidelines. With this in mind, whether practicing
in state or federal court, on a small or large scale, in criminal or civil
cases, a working knowledge of these new rules will be essential to
the attorney so involved.
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE HEARSAY RULE
Wigmore has fixed the origin of the hearsay rule in the period
between 1675 and 1690. The fundamental application of the rule
has been to exclude from evidence all "extra-judicial testimonial
assertions,""' if offered to prove the truth of the facts contained
therein. The basic reason for rejection of the evidence was that it
had no inherent likelihood of truthfulness and it could not be probed
and tested by cross-examination." Since its origin, courts have cre-
ated exceptions to the hearsay rule as particular types of evidence
now FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B); United States v. Karnap, 477 F.2d 390, 392 (4th Cir. 1973)
(dealing with records of regularly conducted activity), citing FED. R. Evw. 803(6); Briggs v.
Zotos Int'l, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 89, 93 (E.D. Va. 1973) (permitting cross-examination of an
expert on reputable authorities with which he is familiar), citing FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
6. Decisions from at least fifteen states have referred to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Representative of them are: State v. Igoe, 206 N.W.2d 291, 294 (N.D. 1973) admitting prior
sworn inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, following FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1);
Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88, 93 (Alaska 1971) permitting prior, unsworn, inconsistent
statements as vroof of the facts contained therein ritino Fn. P. UV-. o0(,)(9)(; (.r %.
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 494 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. 1973) citing FED. R. EvID. 804
whereby a declarant may be "unavailable" if he testifies to a lack of memory on a subject;
and, in a dissenting opinion, see People v. Rodgers, __ Mich. -, 193 N.W.2d 412, 419
(1971), where admissibility of a past recollection recorded is urged and FED. R. EVID. 803(5)
is cited.
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-101 (1973).
8. NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 402, §§ 1-17, 27-37, 70-85, 96-168 (1971).
9. 5 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1364 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMOREI.
10. Id. at § 1361.
11. Id. at § 1362.
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were deemed to be sufficiently trustworthy to warrant their exclu-
sion from the rule. These common law exceptions may vary from
state to state but are generally familiar to the bench and bar.
While each state was developing its own approach to the hear-
say rule, the practice in the federal courts with respect to hearsay,
as well as other problems of evidence, was confusing. When the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" were adopted by the Supreme
Court": in 1937, none of the efforts toward codification of the law of
evidence, later discussed in this article, had begun. Various rules
dealt with the subject of evidence but only in a makeshift manner.
Rule 43(a)"I attempted to guide the federal courts in looking for the
appropriate rule of evidence. The courts could look to statutes of the
United States, rules of evidence in United States courts used in suits
in equity or the rule of evidence applied in the courts of a state
where the federal court was sitting.' However, in the years since
enactment of the rule, consistent application has proven difficult."'
Rule 43(a) encourages admissability and specifies that the rule or
statute which favors the reception of the evidence governs. However,
obvious problems are presented where, for instance, a state rule
admits and a federal statute excludes a given type of evidence.
Other problems have arisen where there has been no federal author-
ity on an evidence question. In some cases, the federal court has
followed what it considered to be the "best approach,"' 7 while in
other cases, state law has been followed." When state court deci-
sions have been found, federal courts have been faced with a di-
lemma: are only the decisions of the highest court in the state bind-
ing or are decisions of lower state courts binding as well?"
12. For a discussion of the background of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see 1B
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.521, at 5601 (2d ed. 1965).
13. The Supreme Court's rule-making power originated with the rule-making statute
of 1934, 28 U.S.C. §§ 723(b) and (c) (1940), later repealed and replaced by the 1948 revision
of the Judicial Code; the present provisions of the rule-making act may be found at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2073 (1970).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 43.
15. Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970).
16. For a discussion of the problem, see Preliminary Study Of The Advisability And
Feasibility Of Developing Uniform Rules Of Evidence For The Federal Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73,
95 (1962).
17. E.g., Peoples Loan & Inv. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 151 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1945).
18. E.g., Pen-Ken Gas & Oil Corp. v. Warfield Natural Gas Co., 137 F.2d 871, 887 (6th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 800 (1944).
19. Supra note 16 at 97.
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The first effort to codify and make uniform the hearsay rule,
together with its exceptions, began in 1898.2" In that year, the Mas-
sachusetts Hearsay Statute of 1898 was enacted:
No declaration of a deceased person shall be excluded as
evidence on the ground of its being hearsay if it appears to
the satisfaction of the judge to have been made in good
faith before the beginning of the suit and upon the personal
knowledge of the declarant.2'
Years later, in 1939, the American Law Institute, with John H.
Wigmore as its consultant, turned to the subject of evidence and in
1942 promulgated the 112 rules comprising the Model Code of Evi-
dence. 2 The Model Code proposed the admission of hearsay when-
ever the declarant had first hand knowledge of the facts declared
and when the declarant was unavailable.2 3: The Model Code proved
to be far too radical a change in existing law and it was never
accepted by any jurisdiction; however, its influence has been felt
since the time of its adoption and it has had a substantial impact
upon the Federal Rules of Evidence. 21
Beginning in 1948, upon the request of the American Law Insti-
tute, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, using the Model Code as a guide, began work toward codify-
ing the rules of evidence. The Uniform Rules of Evidence, consisting
of 72 rules, were approved by the commissioners in 1953 and were
approved by the American Law Institute in 1954.25 The Uniform
Rules moved more slowly than the Model Code, basically codifying
existing case law except for two important changes. The first would
have made prior consistent or inconsistent statements of a witness,
made out of court, admissible as substantive evidence of the facts
contained therein. 2" This proposal has now finally found its way into
20. Act of June 16, 1898, ch. 535 [18981 Mass. Acts & Resolves (now MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 233, § 65 (1956)).
21. Id.
22. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942); see also McCormick, The New Code of Evidence
of the American Law Institute, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 661 (1942).
23. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rule 503(a) (1942); see also McCormick, Some High Lights
of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 559 (1955).
24. See, e.g., remarks of Albert E. Jenner, Esq., Chairman, Advisory Committee on
Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161, 173-81 (1969).
25. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE (1953); see also Gard, Kansas Law and the New Uni-
form Rules of Evidence, 2 KAN. L. REv. 333 (1954).
26. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(1) (1953).
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the Federal Rules of Evidence.27 The second important proposal
pertained to statements of recent perception by an unavailable wit-
ness.2" Although not now a part of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the same proposal was made in the preliminary and revised drafts
of the Judicial Conference"2 but it was deleted by Congress."' To
date, the Uniform Rules have been enacted only in Kansas,3 the
Virgin Islands :2 and the Canal Zone."' However, rules of evidence
have been codified in the states of California34 and New Jersey,
both of which borrow heavily from the Model Code and the Uniform
Rules. Many of the Federal Rules of Evidence have their origin in
one of these prior codifications. :"
While the hearsay rule in this country was generally resisting
efforts at legislative codification, evidence acts were enacted in Eng-
land as early as 1843.1:7 The common law hearsay rule in England
27. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
28. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(4)(c) (1953).
29. Preliminary draft, Proposed Rules of Evidence 804(b)(2), 46 F.R.D. 161, 377 (1969);
revised draft, 51 F.R.D. 315, 438 (1971).
30. The Subcommittee on Criminal Justice voted to delete this proposal because it
"created a new and unwarranted hearsay exception of great potential breadth." Hearings on
Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, at 176 (Supp. 1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973
Hearings Supp. I.
31. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.401-470 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
32. V. I. CODE ANN. tit. 5 §§ 771-956 (1967).
33. C. Z. CODE tit. 5 §§ 2731-2996 (1963).
34. CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1605 (West 1966).
35. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:84A-1-84A-47 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
36. The preliminary draft of the proposed rules of evidence, published in March, 1969,
and found in 46 F.R.D. 161-426 (1969), as well as the revised draft, published in March, 1971,
and found in 51 F.R.D. 315-473 (1971), and the final draft approved by the Supreme Court
and submitted to Congress, found in 56 F.R.D. 183-360 (1973), contain advisory notes follow-
ing each article of the rules. These notes are explanatory of the rules and also contain citations
to the Model Code of Evidence, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, the California Evidence Code,
the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure and the New Jersey Evidence Rules. This article will
occasionally show the relationship between a rule of the Federal Rules of Evidence and one
or more of these codifications. However, no exhaustive treatment is intended. For the com-
plete background of a particular rule and information as to whether it has ever been used
elsewhere, the advisory notes should be consulted.
The Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House of Representatives, in publishing
its revised draft, included certain comments following each article. However, the comments
are not comprehensive and do not detail the rationale behind the changes. For more informa-
tion on the Subcommittee's work and its reasons for the revisions, see Hearings on Proposed
Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearingsl.
37. The Evidence Act of 1843, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85.
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may be summarized as follows:
In England, hearsay evidence, that is to say, the evidence
of a man who is not produced in court and who, therefore,
cannot be cross-examined, as a general rule is not admissi-
ble at all. :"
The Evidence Act of 1938 :' provided that where direct, oral evidence
of a fact would be admissible, any statement made by a person in a
document intended to establish that fact would, on production of
the original document, be admissible as evidence of that fact under
certain conditions. Then, on October 25, 1968, the English Civil
Evidence Act of 1968 became law." Moving from the admission of
hearsay in documents to practically the complete abolition of the
hearsay rule, the Act provided that, in any civil proceeding, an out
of court statement shall be admissible as evidence of any facts con-
tained therein to the extent that it is proven to be admissible by
virtue of the Act." The Act then provided that any such statement,
oral or in a document, made by any person, whether called as a
witness or not, is admissible as evidence of the facts stated therein. 2
The Act further eliminated the common law exceptions to the hear-
say rule by providing for such evidence to be admissible only by
virtue of a statutory provision or by agreement of the parties. While
hearsay is now admissible in civil cases in England, it should be
noted that in civil cases, no right to a trial by jury exists except in
cases of fraud, libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprison-
ment or seduction.' :'
The latest effort to codify the hearsay rule in this country,"
together with other rules of evidence, began in March, 1961, when
the Judicial Conference of the United States approved a proposal
of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure for
38. Dysart Peerage Case, 6 App. Cas. 503 (1881).
:39. The Evidence Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 28.
40. The Civil Evidence Act 1968, c. 64, § 1. The Civil Evidence Act 1972, c. 30, § 1
aut horizes hearsay statetnents of opinion as well as hearsay statements of fact.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. County Courts Act of 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 22, § 94.
44. And perhaps abolish it. See comments of Mr. Frank Raichle, a member of the
Advisory Committee wherein he suggests that "hearsay, in plain English, is gossip." 48
F.R.D. 39-78 (1969).
[Vol. 8
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a Federal Rules of Evidence project.45 Then, on March 8, 1965, the
Chief Justice of the United States, under the program of the Judi-
cial Conference, by virtue of authority conferred by 28 U.S.C.
§ 331, appointed the Advisory Committee on Uniform Rules of
Evidence.4" The advisory committee consisted of distinguished
members of the federal bench, professors of law and members
of the bar with substantial experience in the trial of cases.47 The
committee met until December, 1968, and on January 30, 1969,
submitted to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, its preliminary draft of the Rules of Evidence for the
United States District Courts and Magistrates, the first full-fledged
effort at codification since 1953.48 The standing committee approved
the rules and on March 31, 1969, submitted the proposed rules to
members of the bench and bar and solicited comments by April 1,
1970.19 In October, 1971, the full Judicial Conference of the United
States, after some revisions, approved the proposed rules.50
On November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court of the United
States, with slight revisions, prescribed the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence5 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3771, & 3772, and 28 U.S.C.
§ § 2702 & 2705, to govern procedure in the courts of the United
States.5 2 The rules were to take effect on July 1, 1973, and the Chief
Justice was authorized to transmit the new rules to Congress; but
the Supreme Court did not act unanimously. Mr. Justice Douglas
dissented. 53 He felt that the "fashioning of rules of evidence" was
essentially a task for the judiciary and not for the legislature. He
also questioned whether or not rules of evidence were included in
"practice and procedtire," as used in 28 U.S.C. § 2072, and he felt
that the Court's approval of the rules was merely perfunctory, a
rubber stamp of the work of the Judicial Conference. Although Wig-
45. 30 F.R.D. 73 (1962). The need for any code of evidence was questioned by many.
See, e.g., the testimony of Hon. Arthur J. Goldberg, Former Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, 1973 Hearings, supra note 36, at 142 and the testimony of Hon. Henry J.
Friendly, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, id. at 246.
46. 36 F.R.D. 128 (1965).
47. For the full membership of the Advisory Committee, see 46 F.R.D. 162 (1969).
48. 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969).
49. Id.
50. 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970) gives the Supreme Court the power to prescribe rules for
practice and procedure in the United States District Courts.
52. 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973), 93 S. Ct. 1 (1972).
53. Id. at 185, 93 S. Ct. at 3.
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more was deeply involved, as noted, in the formulation of the Model
Code of Evidence, Mr. Justice Douglas cites him as authority for
judicial development of rules of evidence.
The rules, however, were transmitted to Congress on February
5, 1973. During the years that the rules had been under considera-
tion, certain of them had become quite controversial.54 The rules
regarding privilege, in particular, were being opposed in many
quarters. Privilege would have been largely eliminated except for
the attorney-client privilege and the new psychotherapist-patient
privilege.55 After extensive debate, Congress, feeling that additional
time was required to consider the rules, and having received consid-
erable comment on them, on March 30, 1973, passed Public Law
9312 which provided that the proposed rules would have no force or
effect except to the extent, and with such amendments, as might
be expressly approved by acts of Congress.56
Thereafter, in February and March, 1973, the Special Subcom-
mittee On Reform Of Federal Criminal Laws of the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, chaired by Con-
gressman William L. Hungate of Missouri, conducted extensive
public hearings on the rules. 57 Organizations such as the American
Hospital Association, the American Medical Association, the Amer-
ican Psychoanalytic Association and the American Psychological
Association, as well as various representatives of the organized bar,
appeared and testified before the Committee. The Subcommittee
revised the rules and, on June 28, 1973, published the proposed rules
as amended by the Committee and solicited comments for consider-
ation prior to July 31, 1973.11 The revisions that followed restored
traditional privilege rules and generally eliminated many controver-
sial portions of the rules. In September and October, 1973, the Com-
mittee conducted further hearings and made additional revisions.
On October 10, 1973, the Subcommittee published a final draft of
the proposed rules. 51 With minor changes, the final draft was ap-
proved by the Full Judiciary Committee of the House of Representa-
54. See correspondence from American Medical Association, 1973 Hearings Supp.,
supra note 30, at 281.
55. 56 F.R.D. at 230.
56. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2071 (1973).
57. 1973 Hearings, supra note 36.
58. 1973 Hearings Supp., supra note 30, at 144.
59. See id. at 357 for the results of those hearings.
[Vol. 8
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tives.1"" After further changes, the Federal Rules were approved by
the House of Representatives.' As finally approved, the Rules apply
to cases filed after the effective date of the Rules and to pending
cases except where unjust or not feasible."2
RULE 801: HEARSAY DEFINED
Hearsay is defined by rule 801(c) as an out of court statement
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted."' The statement
may be oral or written or non-verbal, if intended as an assertion.' "
Having defined hearsay, the rules go on to state what it is not. It is
important to remember the distinction between matters which are
not considered hearsay and matters which are hearsay but which are
nonetheless admissible because of some provisions of either rule 803,
if the witness is available, or rule 804, if he is not available.
STATEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT HEARSAY
Rule 801(d)(1)(A): Prior Statements by Witness
A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) . . . The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the state-
ment, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testi-
mony and was given under oath subject to cross-
examination, and subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial
or hearing or in a deposition . . .
The first type of statement which is not hearsay is the prior
inconsistent statement under oath. This rule departs from the ma-
jority rule at common law which is that prior statements inconsist-
ent with the testimony of the declarant as a witness at the trial may
be used to impeach the witness, but that such statements are not
substantive evidence of the facts stated." The question of whether
60. See generally H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
61. 120 CONG. REC. 569-70 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
62. 120 CONG. REC. 316 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974).
63. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
64. FED. R. EviD. 801(a).
65. FED. R. Ev[D. 801(d)(1)(A). It should be noted that all quotations from the Federal
Rules of Evidence are taken from the rules as finally approved by the House of
Representatives as found at 120 CONG. REC. 306-18 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974), and 120 CONG.
REC. 543-70 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
66. United States v. Small, 443 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1971); Shearer v. Cantrell, 145 Ind.
19741
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the use of such a statement against a criminal defendant is violative
of his sixth amendment right of confrontation was answered in the
negative in California v. Green,67 a case arising under the California
Evidence Code with a provision similar to that of rule 801(a).68 The
requirement that the prior inconsistent statement be under oath
was not included in the preliminary draft of the Judicial Confer-
ence," nor in the subsequent revisions thereto, 0 but was included
in the final draft of the House Judiciary Committee." The prelimi-
nary and revised drafts would have made all prior inconsistent
statements admissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the
matters contained therein. The rule does not require the declarant's
prior sworn testimony to have been in the same case. It need only
to have been sworn. The rule differs from rule 603 of the Model Code
of Evidence,7" as well as rule 63 of the Uniform Rules. The view of
the Second Circuit, as expressed in United States v. Cunningham,4
is adopted by the Subcommittee as an acceptable compromise;
however, Cunningham represents the minority view. 5
It is submitted that the rule overemphasizes the importance of
prior sworn testimony. Wigmore says that the oath is merely an
incident of cross-examination and does not furnish an independent
testing method. 6 Having shown a prior inconsistency under oath,
the statement is admissible as proof of the matters contained
therein. It seems strange to suppose that a witness whose veracity
under oath is under attack should be assumed to have earlier testi-
fied truthfully under oath. A prior inconsistent statement, not under
oath, would be covered by rule 613(b)77 which continues the familiar
App. 693, 252 N.E.2d 514 (1969); United States v. Desist, 277 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
alf'd, 384 F.2d 889, afj'd, 394 U.S. 244, reh. denied, 395 U.S. 931 (1969).
67. 399 U.S. 149, 154 (1970).
68. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966).
69. 46 F.R.D. 161, 331 (1969).
70. 51 F.R.D. 15, 413 (1971); 56 F.R.D. 183, 293 (1973).
71. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1973).
72. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 603 (1942).
73. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63 (1953).
74. 446 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1971).
75. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 39, at 78; § 251 at 601 (Cleary ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
76. WIGMORE § 1362.
77. FED. R. EVID. 613(b) provides:
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness.-Extrinsic
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the
[Vol. 8
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requirements of laying a proper foundation and giving the witness
a chance to explain. Rule 60778 discards the so-called "voucher"
rule, thereby permitting the credibility of the witness to be attacked
by any party, including the party calling him.
The inclusion of prior sworn depositions is surprising." By in-
cluding depositions, the rule goes even further than Cunningham.5 0
Frequently, a deposition is taken only for discovery and is not in-
tended to be used as evidence and does not, therefore, include any
meaningful cross-examination. Nevertheless, the presence of an
oath, even without the presence of cross-examination, makes a prior
statement admissible as proof of the facts contained therein. Fur-
thermore, it might be noted, the fact that the word "hearing" is
used would presumably include sworn testimony at administrative
hearings, coroner's inquests"' and license suspension hearings,
which frequently do not include any cross-examination at all.
Whenever an oath is involved, however perfunctory it may have
been, the prior statement takes on added significance. If an oath
was part of the prior statement, even if cross-examination was not,
the statement becomes admissible. This approach is questionable:
it certainly would not have been approved by Wigmore as can be
seen from the following:
[T]he testing required by the Hearsay rule is spoken of as
cross-examination under oath. But it is clear beyond doubt
that the oath, as thus referred to, is merely an incidental
feature customarily accompanying cross-examination, and
that cross-examination is the essential and real test re-
quired by the rule.
[A] statement made under oath is, merely as such,
equally obnoxious to the hearsay rule. It is thus apparent
that the essence of the hearsay rule is a requirement that
witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party
is afttrded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice
otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent
as defined in rule 801 (d) (2).
78. FED. R. Evin. 607 provides: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling him."
The so-called "voucher" rule, by which a party is said to vouch for the credibility of any
witness he calls, was criticized in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
79. WIGMORE § 1376, at 58.
80. 446 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1971).
81. See WIGMORE § 1374.
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testimonial assertions shall be subjected to the test of cross-
examination, and that the judicial expressions . . . cou-
pling oath and cross-examination had in mind the oath as
merely an ordinary accompaniment of testimony given on
the stand subject to the essential test of cross-
examination."
Rule 801(d)(1)(B): Fabrication
A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) . . . The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the state-
ment,, and the statement is . . . (B) consistent with his
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influ-
ence or motive . . :.
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is a very liberal treatment of the recent fabri-
cation rule. Upon an implied charge of recent fabrication, all prior
consistent statements become admissible. Since no time element is
required, the consistent statement could follow the inconsistent
statement."' There is no requirement that the witnesss first deny
that he made the prior inconsistent statement, though this is now
required by some jurisdictions.15 Further, the rule does not specify
who must have made the "charge" against the witness. Conse-
quently, the charge may have come from another witness and not
from the prior inconsistent statements of the witness on the stand.
Thus, a prior consistent statement is admissible, as proof of the
facts stated, even if not under oath, once an adverse party charges,
expressly or impliedly, that there has been a recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive. The prior consistent statement need
not have been written." Since a prior consistent statement would
be substantive evidence of the facts contained therein, a witness
could be impeached by a non-sworn prior inconsistent statement,
used only for impeachment, and rehabilitated by a prior consistent
82. Id. § 1362, at 7.
83. FED. R. EvID. 801 (d)(1)(B).
84. Some states require that prior consistent statements must precede inconsistent
ones. See collection of cases at Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 909 (1961).
85. Id.
86. FED. R. EvID. 801(a)(1).
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statement which would be evidentiary. The use of prior unsworn
inconsistent statements will have to be carefully examined so that
counsel does not unwittingly allow into evidence a consistent state-
ment whose probative value will be greater than the inconsistent
statement.
Rule 801(d)(1)(C): Out-of-Court Identifications
A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) . . . The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the state-
ment, and the statement is . . . (C) one of identification
of a person made after perceiving him. 7
This rule allows into evidence out-of-court identifications, in-
cluding those made at a lineup. The rationale for the exclusion of
such a statement from the hearsay rule is twofold: (1) the witness
is now present and now subject to cross-examination regarding his
prior identification and (2) the prior identification is probably more
reliable than an in-court identification. Thus, rather than finding
an exception for prior identifications, the framers of the rules ex-
cluded them from the operation of the hearsay rule. The evidence
is received as direct, substantive evidence of the identity of the
defendant and not merely as evidence corroborative of other testi-
mony of the witness making the identification, which is the present
majority rule. 8
The rule is limited in its application to prior statements of
identification made by the witness on the stand and does not apply
to testimony of persons merely present when the identification was
made. Their testimony might, however, come in under some excep-
tion to the hearsay rule such as, for example, a present sense
impression." The rule represents a balancing of considerations be-
tween the unprepared but possibly emotional out-of-court identifi-
cation as compared with the unemotional but probably prepared,
and possibly coached, in-court identification. The rule finds the
former identification to be more reliable.
Other problems, however, are presented with an out-of-court
87. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(C).
88. See Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 452 (1960).
89. FED. R. EvID. 803(1). See notes 110-15 infra and accompanying text.
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identification at a police lineup. The right of an accused to be repre-
sented by counsel at such a lineup and his further right to be con-
fronted by witnesses are not within the scope of this article. Those
problems are discussed at some length in Gilbert v. California."'
Admissions by a Party-Opponent
In addition to prior statements by the witness on the stand,
which are excluded from the operation of the hearsay rule, prior
admissions by a party-opponent are also excluded from the rule's
operation by rule 801(d)(1)(C).9 ' Traditionally, admissions of a
party have enjoyed a preferred position and have been regarded as
a unique by-product of the adversary system.2 They have always
been treated as exceptions to the hearsay rule rather than matters
to be excluded from the operation of the rule.13 Because they are not
considered hearsay, no showing of trustworthiness is required. The
admissions may be the party's own or they may be representative
admissions. If an agent makes the admission, it does not have to be
shown that the scope of his agency included the making of admis-
sions. It is sufficient to show that the scope of his agency included
the matter with which the admission was concerned.
RULE 802: THE HEARSAY RULE
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress. 4
The preliminary draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence made
hearsay inadmissible except as provided by these rules, the rules of
civil and criminal procedure and Acts of Congress. 5 The revised
draft deleted the rules of civil and criminal procedure and substi-
tuted rules adopted by the Supreme Court. The final version re-
quires that any Supreme Court rule be prescribed, not adopted, by
the Supreme Court, pursuant to statutory authority, thus assuring
congressional control over further amendments to the rules and fur-
90. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
91. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2).
92. MCCORMICK at § 262.
93. Id.
94. FED. R. Evin. 802.
95. 46 F.R.D. 161, 343 (1969).
96. 51 F.R.D. 315, 418 (1971).
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ther reducing the likelihood of mere adoption by the Supreme Court
of Judicial Conference recommendations.
Rules 1102 and 1103 prescribe the process for amending the
Federal Rules of Evidence."7 A new section is added to the United
States Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2076, whereby the Supreme Court may
prescribe amendments; however, such amendments are not to take
effect if either House of Congress should disapprove of the Court's
viewpoint.'1
The amendments to the existing Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, necessitated by the
Federal Rules of Evidence and ordered by the Supreme Court on
November 20, 1972,1"" and December 18, 1972,""' are approved to
become effective together with the Federal Rules of Evidence them-
selves."' Examples of existing rules and Acts of Congress which
would come within the exception to rule 802 may be found in the
advisory committee notes.""
RULE 803: HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS-AVAILABILITY IMMATERIAL
The exceptions to the hearsay rule, applicable regardless of
whether the declarant is available to testify, are listed in this rule.
The rule includes many of the familiar hearsay exceptions, expands
some of them and adds some new ones. The preliminary draft of rule
803 did not speak of exceptions but rather spoke of "illustrations"
of admissable hearsay."" The preliminary draft also included rule
803(a) which gave to the courts discretion in admitting hearsay
statements if "the special circumstances under which it was made
offer assurances of accuracy not likely to be enhanced by calling the
declarant as a witness, even though he is available."''0 The 1971
revision changed this approach and reverted to the traditional
method of setting forth specific exceptions and dropped 803(a) but
added 803(24) whereby courts were given discretion to admit state-
ments not specifically covered by the exceptions but "having com-
97. FED. R. EVID. 1102-03.
98. FED. R. EVID. 1103.
99. 56 F.R.D. 183, 184 (1973).
100. Id. at 186.
101. FED. R. EvID. 1103(3).
102. 56 F.R.D. at 299.
103. 46 F.R.D. at 345.
104. Id.
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parable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.' '05 Rule
803(24) was subsequently removed by Congress in its entirety so
that the list of exceptions is, once again, complete. Any new excep-
tions will have to come through the amendment process and cannot
be judicially created.
The evidence permitted by an 803 exception, as well as by any
other provisions of the hearsay rules, does not automatically become
admissible. Tendered evidence might be deemed inadmissible be-
cause of other provisions of these rules, 06 or because of other existing
exclusionary principles, 07 but the exclusion of evidence under one
exception of rule 803 does not make it generally excludable. It might
still qualify under another exception. For example, a memorandum
or record might not qualify as a recorded recollection under rule
803(5)11" but might qualify as a record of a regularly conducted
business activity under rule 803(6).09
Rules 803(1), 803(2) and 803(3): Spontaneity
(1) Present sense impression.-A statement describ-
ing or explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immedi-
ately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance.-A statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condi-
tion.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical con-
dition.-A statement of the declarant's then existing state
of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bod-
ily health), but not including a statement of memory or
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it
relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms
of declarant's will."10
These three rules describe exceptions to the hearsay rule for
105. 51 F.R.D. at 422.
106. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. ARTICLE IV, RELEVANCY AND ITS LiMnrs.
107. E.g., state-created rules of privilege.
105. FED. R. EVID. 803(5). See notes 127-35 infra and accompanying text.
109. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). See notes 136-42 infra and accompanying text.
110. FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(3).
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statements made by a declarant before, during or immediately after
an event. Their trustworthiness derives from the spontaneity of the
statement and the fact that fabrication is unlikely since the declar-
ant is merely reacting to an uncontrived event."' None of the excep-
tions, it should be noted, require identification of the declarant.
All of these exceptions, at one time or another, have been part
of the so-called res gestae and they are therefore discussed together.
It should be noted that there is a welcome absence from these Rules
of any incorporation of the res gestae doctrine. Res gestae has be-
come a vague and inexact term often used as a catch-all response
to an opponent's objection to hearsay evidence. It is not unusual to
hear res gestae advanced as a rationale for admission of hearsay
when a better and more precise reason exists. That practice termi-
nates with the passage of these Rules.
Rule 803(1) deals with present sense impressions. This excep-
tion, well-recognized by the writers," 2 frequently came in under the
res gestae umbrella. While the common law exception confined
itself to statements made while the event was being perceived, this
rule includes impressions "immediately thereafter." This change
was first urged by rule 512(a) of the Model Code." 3 The rule, how-
ever, must be carefully distinguished from rule 803(3)"1 since 803(1)
and 803(3) might include the same statement. However, the state-
ment comes in as proof of the event described under 803(1) but,
under 803(3), if the statement is one of memory or belief, it cannot
be used to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates
to the execution, revocation, identification or terms of the
declarant's will.
An example of a present sense impression may be found in
Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis,"' wherein the court allowed a witness
to testify that he had heard a woman exclaim that the occupants of
a car which passed her four miles from the scene of an accident
"must have been drunk." Since, in the court's view, there had not
been enough time for either a faulty memory or a calculated mis-
statement, the woman's impression was deemed trustworthy.
111. WIGMORE §§ 1747, 1750; McCoRMIcK § 288.
112. WIGMORE §§ 1747, 1750; MCCORMICK § 298.
113. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 512(a) (1942).
114. FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
115. 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942).
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Rule 803(2) admits excited utterances, also sometimes brought
in under res gestae. This evidence derives its reliability, according
to McCormick,"' from the "excitement which suspends the powers
of reflection and fabrication." It is submitted, however, that such
excitement might also suspend the power of observation." 7 None-
theless, the exception is not only retained but also broadened so that
the statement may "relate to" the event."' In balance, however, it
is doubtful that much new evidence will come in under this excep-
tion though the possibility of abuse of this exception will continue
to exist. Excited clergymen will continue to disappear while leaving
their excited utterances behind them. However, courts, and particu-
larly juries, have demonstrated that they are well equipped to han-
dle a misuse of this exception.
Rule 803(3) combines several common law exceptions, each,
again, occasionally called res gestae. As stated by the advisory com-
mittee, it is essentially a specialized application of the 803(1) excep-
tion."' Mental, emotional or physical reactions of a witness are
admissible but, as before, not to prove a fact remembered or be-
lieved, except in the case of wills.
Rule 803(4): Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treat-
ment
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment. -Statements made for purposes of medical di-
agnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the incep-
tion or general character of the cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treat-
ment. 
2
Statements made by a patient for the purpose of diagnosis or
treatment are made admissible by this exception as proof of the
facts contained therein. The fact that the exception is drawn in the
disjunctive is significant. Heretofore, some courts have distin-
guished between statements given for purposes of treatment and
116. MCCORMICK § 297.
117. See comment at 48 F.R.D. 39, 54 (1969).
118. See 51 F.R.D. 424 (1971).
119. 56 F.R.D. at 305.
120. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
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those given merely for diagnosis, admitting the former and exclud-
ing the latter.'2 ' The theory has been that patients are more likely
to be truthful when they are in need of treatment than when they
are in need of testimony.'2 The distinction is eliminated by this
rule. This change is unfortunate because the distinction was valid
and based upon experience. When a plaintiff, for example, has con-
sulted a physician for the sole purpose of securing his testimony, the
history given to the physician might be exaggerated or untrue. His
motive and purpose could well be the attainment of successful testi-
mony, not successful treatment. While admitting such statements,
some courts have done so not to establish the truth of the statements
but to show the basis of the doctor's opinion.'23 This distinction also
is removed, the advisory committee noting that juries seldom made
the distinction anyway.'24 It should be noted, however, that not
everything a patient says comes in under this exception. A descrip-
tion of the event in question for example, not necessary for a diagno-
sis or treatment, is excluded.
The exception places no limitation on the class of persons to
whom the statement may be given. It may be given to anyone if
given for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, including
nurses, ambulance attendants and, presumably, members of the
family furnishing first aid. Where the statement is given to a nurse
who in turn records it in the records of the physician, the physician
may testify to the statement. The statement to the nurse would be
admissible under rule 803(4), the doctor's testimony would be ad-
missible under rule 803(6)125 and the double hearsay problem would
be eliminated by rule 805.1'2 This presents a good illustration of the
way in which the various parts of Article Eight can be coordinated.
121. Chicago and Northwestern Ry. v. Garwood, 167 F.2d 848, 859 (8th Cir. 1948), and
cases cited therein; Nutt v. Black Hills Stage Lines, Inc., 452 F.2d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 1971).
122. See United States v. Nickle, 60 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1932).
123. See, e.g., Durham Mfg. v. Hutchins, 115 Ind. App. 479, 59 N.E.2d 444 (1945); Wise
v. Monteros, 93 Ariz. 124, 379 P.2d 116 (1963); Tycer v. Hartsell, 184 Ore. 310, 198 P.2d 263
(1948).
124. 56 F.R.D. 183, 306 (1973).
125. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (records of regularly conducted activity). See notes 136-42
infra and accompanying text.
126. FED. R. EVID. 805 (hearsay within hearsay). See note 201 infra and accompanying
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Rule 803(5). Recorded Recollection
(5) Recorded recollection.-A memorandum or re-
cord concerning a matter about which a witness once had
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable
him to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh
in his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If
admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into
evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless
offered by an adverse party. 27
Rule 803(5) contains the doctrine of past recollection recorded,
long recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. 28 Under the
rule, the prior recollection is admitted upon a showing that the
witness has no present memory of the facts. Rather than losing the
testimony, the prior memorandum or record is received in evidence,
assuming that the other requirements of the rule have been satis-
fied.
The rationale behind the doctrine survived attack on constitu-
tional grounds in United States v. Kelly.' 21 In Kelly, the defendants
contended that their sixth amendment right of confrontation was
abridged because they were unable to cross-examine a prior re-
corded recollection. The argument was rejected, the court noting
that the doctrine was one of long standing and was supported by
considerable authority. ':
The rule is to be distinguished from the doctrine of present
recollection refreshed. Under this latter doctrine, the prior memo-
randum or record may be used to jog the memory of the witness but,
once his memory is refreshed, he testifies from memory and the
written document is normally not received into evidence. 1'
Evcn if t ernlum or record s received -n evidence,
it may not be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse
party. Since it is in the nature of a self-serving document and since
127. FED. R. EVID. 803(5).
128. 3 J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 754a (Chadbourn ed. 1970); MCCORMICK § 299.
129. 349 F.2d 720, 770 (2d Cir. 1965).
130. Id.
131. Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 473, 512 (1962).
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exhibits may, in the discretion of the judge,' 2 be sent to the jury
room, this latter provision is a sound one. If the recorded recollec-
tion could be received as an exhibit, and if it were taken into the
jury room, its constant presence during deliberations could make it
more persuasive than live testimony.
The exception as now drawn requires a showing that the state-
ment was either made or adopted by the witness. The preliminary :'
and revised' drafts did not include this requirement and, therefore,
a statement prepared by a third person would have been admissible.
Congress recognized the dangers inherent in the original drafts.
Statements given to insurance carriers, for example, would have
been admissible upon a showing of a lack of memory by the witness.
The change made by Congress is consistent with the definition of a
statement in 18 U.S.C. § 3500'15 which deals with statements of
witnesses called by the United States in a criminal prosecution. The
final version requires that the statement must either be that of the
witness, made close to the event, or that of a witness which the
declarant has ratified or adopted. Presumably, the recorded state-
ment of an agent, seen and uncorrected by his principal, and
thereby adopted by him, would qualify as a past recorded recollec-
tion of the principal.
Rules 803(6) and 803(7): Business Records
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity.-A
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from information transmit-
ted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the reg-
ular practice of that business activity to make the memo-
randum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown
by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified wit-
ness, unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph in-
132. Ahem v. Webb, 268 F.2d 45, 47 (10th Cir. 1959).
133. 46 F.R.D. 161, 346 (1969).
134. 51 F.R.D. 315, 420 (1971).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
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cludes business, profession, occupation, and calling of every
kind.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph (6).-Evidence that a
matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records,
or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence
or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind
of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compila-
tion was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources
of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness. 136
Rule 803(6) defines the business records exception to the hear-
say rule and rule 803(7) permits introduction of evidence of the
absence of those records. Originally drafted to cover records of all
regularly conducted activities, the rules now pertain only to busi-
ness records, defined as records of a business, profession, occupation
and calling of every kind. Evidence of business records in the United
States courts have heretofore been covered by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1732(a), 137 which is quite similar to 803(6) and which is specifi-
cally repealed by rule 1103 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 3"
The key to the exception is that the preparation of the records
was part of a routine, ordinary business practice and should there-
fore be trustworthy. If records are not so prepared but rather are
prepared in anticipation of litigation, they are excluded. Thus, in
Yates v. Blair Transport, Inc.,'39 medical reports of doctors who
examined the plaintiff for his workmen's compensation carrier were
admissible as business records while reports of the plaintiff's own
physician who examined him for trial were not.
Under the rule, hospital records, medical reports, police reports
and cho! rcors lcc~ne u'rissble Th fut 'tiiat L1ese records
might contain opinions of lay witnesses does not render them inad-
missible since the rule specifically permits opinion evidence. Fur-
136. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) & (7).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1970).
138. FED. R. EVID. 1103.
139. 249 F.2d 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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thermore, rule 701" is authority for the admission in evidence of
limited forms of opinion testimony by lay witnesses.
The elimination of the hearsay objection does not make the
records automatically admissible in evidence. Thus, for instance, an
objection on privilege grounds might still be interposed to an offer
in evidence of medical and hospital records.
Although suggested by the advisory committee and included in
both the preliminary"' and revised"2 drafts, records of non-business
activity are not within the purview of this rule. Consequently, it
seems certain that records of purely personal activity, such as dia-
ries and calendars, would be excluded. Similarly, it is doubtful
whether records of political parties would be within the scope of the
rule.
Rule 803(7), permitting evidence of the non-existence of busi-
ness records, makes sense. A well-known trial tactic is to suggest to
the jury that certain records do exist but that the opposition has
failed to produce them. The rule will permit the introduction of
evidence that no such records exist.
Rules 803(8), 803(9) and 803(10): Public Records
(8) Public records and reports.-Records, reports,
statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public
offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the
office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty
imposed by law, as to which there was a duty to report;
excluding, however, in criminal cases, matters observed by
police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C)
in civil actions and proceedings and against the Govern-
ment in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law,
unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
140. FED. R. EvID. 701 provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based
on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
141. 46 F.R.D. 161, 346 (1969).
142. 51 F.R.D. 315, 420 (1971).
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(9) Records of vital statistics.-Records or data com-
pilations, in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or
marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office
pursuant to requirements of law.
(10) Absence of public record or entry.-To prove the
absence of a record, report, statement, or data compilation,
in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a mat-
ter of which a record, report, statement, or data compila-
tion, in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certifica-
tion in accordance with rule 902, or testimony, that diligent
search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or
data compilation, or entry. "'
These three rules cover records of public offices, records of vital
statistics and the absence of such records. Heretofore, records of
federal agencies were made admissible by 28 U.S.C. § 1733,11
which is now made inapplicable to cases arising under the Federal
Rules of Evidence by virtue of rule 1103(c). 145 The rules apply to
federal agencies as well as to non-federal public agencies.
Rule 803(8)(B) was the subject of considerable debate and last
minute amendment. The rule was changed on the day the House of
Representatives finally passed the Federal Rules of Evidence.'46 As
originally written, anything reported by a public official could have
been introduced into evidence. "7 There had also been some concern
that chance observations by, for instance, social workers, would be
reported and later used in evidence. "8 Calling this an "extraordi-
nary departure from existing law,"'49 Representative Elizabeth
143. FED. R. EvID. 803(8)-(10).
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1733 (1970).
145. FED. R. EvIn. 1103(c).
146. See generallv 120 CONG. REC. 563-65 (daily ed. Feb. 6. 1974) (debate concernina
amendments to rule 803).
147. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1973).
148. Thus, a social worker's report of a random observation of a marital relation-
ship could be introduced in a criminal case against one of the spouses. Similarly, a
policeman's report containing an observation of an alleged criminal offense
could be used in the criminal trial instead of having the police officer himself tes-
tify. . . . [The rule] gives more credibility to the observations of government em-
ployees than are given to observations of private citizens.
120 CONG. REc. 311 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974) (remarks of Representative Elizabeth Holtzman).
149. Id.
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Holtzman introduced the amendment which makes only those ob-
servations admissible which the official had a duty to report.''
Representative David W. Dennis then introduced the final proviso
which places observations of police officers and other law enforce-
ment personnel in a separate category, their observations being,
presumably, more credible than those of other public officials.15
The most controversial of these three rules is rule 803(8)(C)
which permits the introduction, in civil cases and against the gov-
ernment in criminal cases, of factual findings resulting from an
official investigation. Factual findings are to be distinguished from
the opinions and evaluations leading to those findings. Such opin-
ions and evaluations are not admissible, according to the comments
of the House Subcommittee, '52 which also expressed the legislative
desire that the term "factual findings" be strictly construed.' The
advisory committee comments, on the other hand, seem to contem-
plate that "evaluative reports" would be admissible.'54 Hours of
debate should follow the offer into evidence of, for example, a coro-
ner's finding that a driver was operating his vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. The debate will focus on whether
such a finding is a factual finding or merely an evaluation by the
coroner.
Public investigations, such as coroner's inquests, will take on a
new significance in civil cases under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Since testimony at such proceedings is normally taken under oath,
inconsistent statements would be outside the scope of the hearsay
rule and would be admissible as proof of the facts contained
therein; 55 the factual findings of the coroner would be admissible 56
and an unavailable witness' testimony at the inquest would come
in as an exception under rule 804(b)(1).1 7
Rule 803(8), it should be noted, gives the court discretion to
exclude matters contained in public reports and records upon a
150. 120 CONG. REc. 563 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
151. Id.
152. 1973 Hearings Supp., supra note 30, at 174.
153. !d.
154. 46 F.R.D. 161, 364 (1969).
155. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
156. FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(c).
157. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (former testimony). See notes 181-85 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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showing of a lack of trustworthiness, but the exact meaning of this
term will not be known until appropriate cases have been presented
for decision. Records of vital statistics, in any form, and by whom-
ever kept, are made admissible by rule 803(9) providing that a re-
port thereof was made to a public office pursuant to law. The official
records themselves are not required by the rule and the records may
have been maintained privately so long as a report thereof was made
to a public office.
Rule 803(10) is similar to rule 803(7) with regard to the proof
of absence of public records. A rule 902 certification may be intro-
duced into evidence to prove the absence of a public record, report,
statement or data compilation. Proof may be had of not just the
absence of the record, but also the nonoccurrence of an event nor-
mally recorded.
Rules 803(11), 803(12), 803(13), 803(14), 803(15), 803(16) and
803(17): Miscellaneous Reports
(11) Records of religious organizations. -Statements
of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry,
relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of
personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept
record of a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certifi-
cates.-Statements of fact contained in a certificate that
the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or ad-
ministered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public offi-
cial, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of
a religious organization or by law to perform the act certi-
fied, and purporting to have been issued at the time of the
act or within a reasonable time thereafter.
(13) Family records.-Statements of fact concerning
personal or fainly history u oxiaiIneu in family Bibles, ge-
nealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on fam-
ily portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or
the like.
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in
property.-The record of a document purporting to estab-
lish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the content
of the original recorded document and its execution and
delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been
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executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an
applicable statute authorizes the recording of documents of
that kind in that office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in
property.-A statement contained in a document purport-
ing to establish or affect an interest in property if the mat-
ter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document,
unless dealings with the property since the document was
made have been inconsistent with the truth of the state-
ment or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents. -Statements
in a document in existence twenty years or more the au-
thenticity of which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications.-
Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other
published compilations, generally used and relied upon by
the public or by persons in particular occupations. 58
These seven rules are relatively non-controversial, introduce
little new to the law of evidence and require little comment. Rule
803(11) fills a possible void created by rule 803(6) which would
require a showing that a religious organization was a business in
order for its records to be admissible. Rule 803(11) dispenses with
the necessity for such a showing but limits the matters which may
be shown through the items designated in the rule. Rule 803(12) fills
in a possible void created by rule 803(9) since a clergyman would
probably not be considered a public officer under rule 803(9). All of
the matters covered by rule 803(12) were probably heretofore admis-
sible as "official written statements"'59 but their admissibility is
now clearly and precisely guaranteed. Rule 803(14) provides for the
admissibility of recorded documents affecting an interest in prop-
erty and rule 803(15) pertains to unrecorded documents affecting an
interest in property. Rule 803(15) would also apply to wills, unre-
corded contracts for the sale of real estate and unrecorded deeds and
trusts so long as the documents purport to establish an interest in
property. Rule 803(16) changes the common law definition of the
time when documents become ancient. Traditionally, documents
158. FED. R. EVID. 803(11)-(17).
159. See MCCORMICK § 315.
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become ancient when they are 30 years of age or older.' " The rule
reduces the time to 20 years. Finally, rule 803(17) permits the use
of published compilations, including telephone directories, without
proof of their accuracy or reliability.
Rule 803(18): Learned Treatises
(18) Learned treaties [sic].-To the extent called to
the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination
or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements
contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets
on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art,
established as a reliable authority by the testimony or ad-
mission of the witness or by other export [sic] testimony
or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be
read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.'" '
One of the most significant categories of hearsay, previously
inadmissible, but allowed by the new Federal Rules is found in rule
803(18). This rule permits the reception into evidence of learned
treatises, periodicals and pamphlets, if relied on by an expert wit-
ness and if established as a reliable authority. If received in evi-
dence, the material may be read to the jury but may not be received
as an exhibit. This represents a departure from the traditional
method of using such material only on cross-examination for the
purpose of impeachment.' 2 The problem with using it on cross-
examination was that the opposing expert had to first admit that
he recognized the impeaching material as authoritative. If he did
not, it could not be used. Under this new rule, the material in
question may be used on direct as well as on cross-examination of
an expert.
The rule consequently permits an expert on direct examination
to become a spokesman for a whole body of scientific authority. If
properly used, the rule puts the leading experts in any field at the
disposal of counsel and his local expert, without cost. The opposing
party may also use this procedure on cross-examination, as before,
but the real significance lies in its use on direct examination. After
the expert testifies to the efforts made by him to form his opinion,
160. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 111 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
161. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
162. 31 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence § 67 (1967).
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he may then be asked if he relied on other authorities to form that
opinion. If he has, these authorities may then be admitted as direct
evidence. The possibilities are endless. The professor of mechanical
engineering at the local university, for example, can buttress his
opinion with published works from the leading scientific institutions
in the country and such works are then received as direct evidence
on the matter in controversy.
The rule puts no limitation on the type of expert. So long as the
court finds him to be an expert, he can give his opinion and support
it with learned material. It is significant that rule 70213 permits
experts by experience to testify. Accordingly, a carpenter, garage
mechanic or welder, if found by the court to be an expert, may
become the vehicle for counsel to read into evidence published ma-
terial upon which the expert has relied.
Consider the effect in a products liability case. Aside from the
obvious financial savings, the plaintiff's expert can testify that he
relied on scientific papers published by the defendant's manufac-
turer, or its employees, or by trade associations of which the defen-
dant is a member, or by the very experts upon whom the defendant
will also rely.
While it is generally true that testimony read into evidence may
not be as effective as live testimony, it can have its advantages.
First, there is no fear of losing the effect on cross-examination. Sec-
ond, the rule does not specify who is to read the material into evi-
dence. Therefore, counsel can select a reader whose appearance and
voice will be pleasing to the jury. The jury will tend to unconsciously
associate the reader with the author of the article.
There were some efforts to eliminate even the requirement that
a live expert first testify that he relied on the learned material. It
was suggested that, particularly in medical malpractice cases, this
rule will not be very helpful because the plaintiff will still have to
find a doctor who will testify against the defendant doctor. The rule,
however, does retain the requirement that a live witness first testify
163. FED. R. EvID. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
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that he relied upon the learned material before the material may be
placed in evidence.
The whole field of expert testimony will be changed by the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Consider rule 803(18) in conjunction
with rule 704. 114 Under 704, the traditional argument that a question
is objectionable because it calls for an answer which would "invade
the province of the jury" will not work since rule 704 permits a
witness to testify on an ultimate issue. Certainly an expert witness
also would be permitted to so testify. Rule 703115 permits an expert
to rely on facts or data which were not received in evidence. There-
fore, a physician, for instance, who may be a general practitioner
and who has ordered x-rays to be interpreted by a radiologist, would
not find his opinion at trial successfully objected to merely because
he relied on the hearsay report of the absent radiologist in forming
his opinion. It seems clear that rule 803(18), together with the other
rules on expert testimony, should make it mandatory that counsel
discover, prior to trial, not only the names of the experts who will
be testifying against him but also the learned material upon which
that expert may rely.
Rules 803(19), 803(20) and 803(21): Reputation Evidence
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family his-
tory. -Reputation among members of his family by blood,
adoption, or marriage, or among his associates, or in the
community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, mar-
riage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood,
adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of his
personal or family history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general his-
tory. -Reputation in a community, arising before the con-
troversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in
164. FED. R. EVID. 704 provides:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact.
165. FED. R. EVID. 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admiss-
able in evidence.
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the community, and reputation as to events of general his-
tory important to the community or State or nation in
which located.
(21) Reputation as to character.-Reputation of a
person's character among his associates or in the com-
munity. " '
These three rules apply to evidence of reputation and eliminate
the hearsay objection to such evidence. Rules 803(19) and 803(20)
are largely the same as existing case law and require no further
comment.
Rule 803(21) deals with reputation evidence of character and
permits reputation to be proven by a witness who is familiar with
the reputation if not with the person whose character is in question.
It is important to stress that the exception goes only to the question
of how character can be proven, i.e., by reputation among asso-
ciates, and not to the question of whether the evidence is admissible
and, if so, to what extent and for what purpose. These matters are
governed by other rules, principally rules 404, 405 and 608.117 The
166. FED. R. EVID. 803(19)-(21).
167. FED. R. EVID. 404, 405 and 608 provide:
Rule 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible To Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other
Crimes
(a) Character evidence generally.-Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of his character is not admissible for the purposes of proving that he acted in conform-
ity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused.-Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim.-Evidence of a pertinent trait of the victim of the
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of
a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homi-
cide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness.-Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided
in rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.-Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab-
sence of mistake or accident.
Rule 4W. Methods of Proving Character
(a) Reputation.-In all cases in which evidence or a trait of character of a
person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation. On cross-
examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct.-In cases in which character or a trait of
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methods of proving character are listed in rule 405 and the admissi-
bility of character is governed by rule 608. When the effort is to
prove a person's character in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith at the time in question, rule 803(21) will not
come into play until the requirements of both rules 404 and 405, or
rule 608, have been satisfied. For example, character may be proven
in one of the three instances set forth in rule 404; rule 405(a) then
authorizes 803(21) testimony. Rule 608(a) permits 803(21) testi-
mony to show reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
The rules go so far as to allow opinion evidence of character.
This was permitted under both the preliminary"8 and revised,"
drafts, was eliminated by the House Judiciary Committee 71 and
reinstated by the full House of Representatives. 7'
Rules 803(22) and 803(23): Prior Judgments
(22) Judgment of previous conviction.-Evidence of
a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of
guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging
a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprison-
ment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to
sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by
character of a person is an essential element of charge, claim, or defense, proof may
also be made of specific instances of his conduct.
Rule 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness
(a) Reputation evidence of character.-The credibility of a witness may be
attacked or supported by evidence in the form of reputation, but subject to these
limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissable only after the character
of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct.-Specific instances of the conduct of a wit-
ness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction
of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
however, in the discretion ot the court, it probative ot truthfulness or untruthtulness,
be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which char-
acter the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does
not operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination when examined
with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
168. 46 F.R.D. 161, 231 (1969).
169. 51 F.R.D. 315, 348 (1971).
170. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1973).
171. H.R. Res. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 569-70 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
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the Government in a criminal prosecution for purposes
other than impeachment, judgments against persons other
than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown
but does not affect admissibility.
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general his-
tory, or boundaries.-Judgments as proof of matters of per-
sonal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential to
the judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence
of reputation.
72
The hearsay aspects of prior judgments are covered by these
rules. If within the confines of these rules, the prior judgment may
be used to prove, in the case of prior judgments of conviction, any
facts essential to sustain the judgment, and in the case of rule
803(23), personal, family or general history, or boundaries, if these
matters were essential to the judgment, but not to prove reputation.
The rules deal only with the hearsay aspects of such judgments and
not with the questions of res judicata and collateral estoppel., 71 Prior
judgments of conviction, if specified in rule 803(22), thus would be
admissible in a subsequent civil suit to prove the facts determined
in a criminal case. The use of prior judgments of conviction for the
purpose of impeachment, and not to prove facts, is covered by rule
609.174
RULE 804: HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS-DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE
This rule adds exceptions to the hearsay rule but includes the
requirement that the declarant be unavailable to testify in person.
Not only the usual notions of unavailability, i.e., death, illness or
absence from the subpoena power of the court are used; 804(a) also
specifies that a refusal to testify on a subject or a claim of privilege
or a lack of memory'75 on a subject is equivalent to unavailability.
In order to qualify under 804(b) (2), (3) or (4) a showing is required
that neither the attendance of the witness nor his testimony (pre-
sumably by deposition) could be obtained.
172. FED. R. EVID. 803(22) and (23).
173. The questions of res judicata and collateral estoppel are discussed in the advisory
committee notes, 51 F.R.D. 315, 436 (1971).
174. FED. R. EvID. 609.
175. For impeachment purposes, some states take the position that when a witness is
cross-examined on a prior inconsistent fact or statement and, when asked if he did not do
the act or make the statement, he says he does not recollect, it is the same as if he had
answered in the negative. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-1-15-1 (1973).
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The preliminary draft of the Federal Rules did not define una-
vailability and continued the practice found in rule 803 of listing
illustrations of exceptions, leaving further development to the
courts.'7  The revised draft changed the approach by referring to
exceptions rather than illustrations but also added rule 804(b)(6)
which left some discretion in the courts."' The final draft of the
House Judiciary Committee, however, removed this discretion from
the courts by deleting 804(b)(6), thereby making the list of excep-
tions complete.'7
It is noteworthy that of the three types of out-of-court declara-
tions covered by Article Eight, the type covered by rule 804 is the
most restrictive. Rule 801111 freed certain types of evidence from all
hearsay restrictions and rule 803180 broadly expanded the traditional
exceptions and made them applicable irrespective of whether the
declarant was available. Rule 804, however, requires a showing of
unavailability as defined in 804(a) and then permits only four types
of statements to be used.
Rule 804(b): Hearsay Exceptions
(b) . . . The following are not excluded by the hear-
say rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. -Testimony given as a witness
at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or
in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course
of the same or another proceeding, if the party against
whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or
proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity
and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination."'1
This rule permits the prior testimony of a witness to be used
as evidence of the facts contained therein if the witness is unavaila-
ble. The prior testimony may have been at an earlier hearing of the
matter under consideration or at an entirely different proceeding
and prior depositions in either the same or another proceeding are
176. 46 F.R.D. at 377.
177. 51 F.R.D. at 438.
178. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1973).
179. FED. R. Evm. 801.
180. FED. R. Evm. 803.
181. FED. R. Evil. 804(b)(1).
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included. In order for any such testimony to be used, the party
against whom it is offered, or his predecessor in interest, must have
had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by
direct, cross or redirect examination.
Both the preliminary"'2 and revised18 drafts of the Federal
Rules made the former testimony usable if it was given at the in-
stance of or against a party whose motive and interest was similar
to those of the party against whom the testimony was being offered.
Feeling that this bound a party to another party's handling of the
witness, Congress restricted the use of former testimony unless the
opposing party's predecessor in interest had the opportunity to de-
velop the testimony. Although no definition is given of "predecessor
in interest," it is certainly more confining than the term "similar
motive and interest."
The use of an unavailable witness' prior testimony or deposition
taken in the same cause is clearly proper and consistent with exist-
ing federal practice. However, problems arise when the testimony
or deposition was in an entirely unrelated proceeding with different
parties and different issues. As mentioned earlier in this article, a
deposition may be taken only for discovery and may not include any
real cross-examination. Nonetheless, a party may find such testi-
mony used against him if his "predecessor in interest" was present
at the deposition and had the opportunity to develop such testi-
mony, even though he may not have done so.
Another problem may arise with the new definition of unavaila-
bility. As pointed out earlier, rule 801184 permits the use of prior
inconsistent testimony at the trial. Rule 804 permits the use of any
prior testimony if the witness is now unavailable. Unavailability, it
should be noted, includes a lack of memory. If a witness testifies at
the trial, his prior inconsistent testimony may come in under rule
801. As to any parts of his testimony to which he professes a lack of
memory, rule 804 prior testimony can be used.
The use of the term "predecessor in interest" is unfortunate. It
is a loosely drawn compromise between two views and will be a
fruitful ground for debate in the years to come. The proposal of the
182. 46 F.R.D. at 377.
183. 51 F.R.D. at 438.
184. FED. R. EvID. 801.
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House of Delegates of the American Bar Association would have
permitted prior testimony against a party whose "incentive, interest
and position" was substantially identical., This would have been
a better result. Consider the following scenario: A and B are in-
volved in an accident allegedly caused by C. A sues C. A calls
witness X to testify at the trial and C calls witness Y. Both X and
Y saw the accident. The jury believes witness Y, apparently disbe-
lieving witness X, and C wins. Now, B sues C. Both X and Y are
unavailable. The former testimony of X can be used by B against
C but C cannot use the testimony of Y against B because neither B
nor his predecessor in interest had an opportunity to develop the
testimony. Therefore, B wins and C loses. This result would not
have been possible under either the preliminary or revised drafts or
under the American Bar Association's proposal. Hopefully, one of
these proposals will be adopted in the future.
(2) Statement under belief of impending death.-In
a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding,
a statement made by a declarant while believing that his
death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstan-
ces of what he believed to be his impending death. "
This is one of the oldest exceptions to the hearsay rule and, as
pointed out earlier, was the first to be codified by statute.17 The
guarantee of trustworthiness is obvious. In order to use the state-
ment, the witness need not have died, it being sufficient if he is
unavailable, and if he thought he was dying when he made the
statement. The statement can be used only if it concerned the cause
or circumstances of what the witness believed to be his impending
death.
Neither the preliminary' nor revised'88 drafts included the
preamble language "in a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action
or pro- dn, this having been adde~d by Cuiigress. T his addition
restored the common law treatment of dying declarations in crimi-
185. See the recommendation by the Committee on Federal Practice and Procedure
which was approved by the House of Delegates, 1973 Hearings Supp., supra note 30, at 337.
186. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
187. See, e.g., Pen-Ken Gas & Oil Corp. v. Warfield Natural Gas Co., 137 F.2d 871,
887 (6th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 800 (1944).
188. 46 F.R.D. at 378.
189. 51 F.R.D. at 438.
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nal cases but expanded their use into civil cases as well, the Sub-
committee noting, however, that their use in civil cases could lead
to the possibility of forum shopping.9 0
(3) Statement against interest.-A statement which
was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declar-
ant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject him to criminal liability, that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the statement unless he
believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the
accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstan-
ces clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. A
statement or confession offered against the accused in a
criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person im-
plicating both himself and the accused, is not within this
exception."'
Statements against a declarant's pecuniary or proprietary in-
terest, if the declarant was unavailable, have traditionally been
treated as exceptions to the hearsay rule.'92 Both the preliminary9 3
and the revised'94 drafts would have made an absent declarant's
statements admissible if they tended to subject him to civil or crimi-
nal liability, render invalid a claim by him against another or make
him an object of hatred, ridicule or disgrace. The final version, as
shown, includes statements against penal interest, but none of the
other changes. The present rule also excepts confessions of co-
defendants and co-conspirators if offered against a defendant in a
criminal case. The inclusion of statements against penal interest is
the major change in this rule.
It is important to distinguish between statements against inter-
est, covered by this rule, and admissions of a party, covered by rule
801; " the two are sometimes confused. Admissions apply only to a
party; statements against interest apply to any witness. Admissions
may or may not be against interest, but usually are. Admissions
190. 1973 Hearings Supp., supra note 30, at 176.
191. FED. R. EVID. 804(c)(3).
192. See, e.g., Gichner v. Antonio, 410 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
193. 46 F.R.D. at 378.
194. 51 F.R.D. at 438.
195. FED. R. EvID. 801.
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may be shown even though the declarant is available; statements
against interest can be used only if the declarant is unavailable.
An example of how the changed rule will work may be illus-
trated by Chambers v. Mississippi,"' if the facts were to be slightly
altered. In Chambers, Gable MacDonald, both orally and in writing,
confessed to the crime with which the defendant was charged. The
defendant's efforts to call the witnesses who had heard the state-
ments of MacDonald were blocked by the trial court, and by the
Mississippi Supreme Court, on hearsay grounds. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, however, citing rule 804
(although not applicable because MacDonald was available), and
suggested the admissibility of statements against penal interest. In
order to bring the case squarely within rule 804, it should be as-
sumed that MacDonald was in fact unavailable or was unavailable
because of a refusal to testify. Under rule 804, MacDonald's state-
ment would be admissible but, since it would be offered to exculpate
the defendant, it would not come in unless "corroborating circum-
stances" clearly indicated its trustworthiness.
Since statements against penal interest can be used, under the
proper circumstances, to exculpate a criminal defendant, the House
Committee recognized that results such as those found in Donnelly
v. United States'"7 would be changed. In Donnelly, the confession
ofa decedent, clearly showing his involvement and tending to excul-
pate the defendant, was excluded because the statement was not
against his pecuniary interest but only against his criminal interest.
As Justice Holmes once said, in a dissenting opinion: "[N]o other
statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder; it
is far more calculated to convince than dying declarations, which
would be let in to hang a man."''9
(4) Statement of personal or family history.-(A) A
marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adop-
tion, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal
or family history, even though declarant had no means of
acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated; or (B)
196. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
197. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
198. Id. (dissenting opinion).
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a statement concerning the foregoing matters, and death
also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately
associated with the other's family as to be likely to have
accurate information concerning the matter declared.'"'
There are no remarkable changes in this rule except, as stated
in the comments of the advisory committee, the following: (1) The
declaration need not have been made before the controversy arose;
(2) The declarant may testify if he is not related to but has an
intimate association with the family; (3) If the statement concerns
a relationship between two other persons, the declarant need not
qualify as to both.2 "'
RULE 805: HEARSAY WITHIN HEARSAY
Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under
the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements
conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in
these rules.2"
The rule is self-explanatory. In order for several items of hear-
say to come in, each must independently meet evidentiary stan-
dards; if so, the fact that it is included within other hearsay does
not make it inadmissible.
RULE 806: ATTACKING AND SUPPORTING CREDIBILITY OF DECLARANT
When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evi-
dence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and
if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would
be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified
as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the
declarant at any time, inconsistent with his hearsay state-
ment, is not subject to any requirement that he may have
been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the
party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted
calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to
examine him on the statement as if under cross-
examination.""2
199. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(4).
200. 46 F.R.D. at 387.
201. FED. R. EvID. 805.
202. FED. R. EvID. 806.
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A hearsay statement, once admitted, may be attacked and sup-
ported as if the declarant had testified in court. It is proper to show
any inconsistent statement or conduct of the declarant, at any time,
whether or not he was given a chance to deny or explain it. If a
declarant is later called as a witness by a party against whom the
statement was given, that party may then cross-examine the wit-
ness.
This rule gives to the trial lawyer, against whom hearsay evi-
dence has been used, three weapons of attack: (1) He may attack
the credibility of the declarant as if he were present;"" (2) He may
show inconsistent conduct or statements of the declarant; and/or (3)
He may call the declarant as his own witness and cross-examine him
on the statement. This rule provides a check on the possible abusive
use of hearsay evidence as permitted by the Federal Rules. It should
compel the careful advocate to be certain that the witness himself
cannot testify before he relies on the hearsay evidence, even though
such may otherwise be permitted.
In order to aid the party disadvantaged by the lack of the op-
portunity to cross-examine, counsel is further permitted to intro-
duce the prior inconsistencies whether they occurred before or after
the statement in question and whether or not the declarant was ever
given a chance to explain or deny, as required by rule 613(b).1111 In
other words, impeachment is proper even without laying a founda-
tion.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Rules of Evidence will change the trial practice in
the United States District Courts and Magistrates Courts. The
hearsay changes in particular will be of great significance. Many
state courts will adopt some or all of the Federal Rules as appropri-
ate eases nr. nrP.ent.ed and many state legispat,.res will considpr
codes of evidence patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Having now enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress
has also created the machinery to amend them. The tendency will
be to liberalize the Rules over the years and to adopt some of the
recommendations of the Judicial Conference which have been re-
20:. F%). R. EvID. 608. See note 167 supra for the text of rule 608.
204. FED}. R. EviD. 613(h). See note 77 supra for the text of rule 613(b).
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jected by Congress. The hearsay rule, weakened considerably by
Article Eight, will continue to be eroded by judicial interpretations
and congressional amendments. Innovations, such as statements of
recent perception, will become recognized exceptions to the rule.
The trend is clear: allow the hearsay evidence to be admitted and
then permit the finder of fact to weigh its reliability.
It would not be surprising, in the years to come, to see American
courts follow the English lead in the abolition of the hearsay rule
entirely. If so, Article Eight will have been the first step in that
process.
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